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This paper uses data from the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2 (2003/2004) to find 
evidence to whether children are less likely to work and more likely to attend school in 
a household where the mother has a say in the intra-family decision-making, than in one 
where the father holds all the power. This is done by using a bivariate probit model with 
two dependent variables: child labour and school attendance. The results support the 
hypothesis that in households where mothers have bargaining power, measured in 
particular with mother’s non-labour income (remittances), mother’s marriage age and 
her awareness of fertility controlling, children are less likely to be sent to work. They 
are also more likely to attend school. 
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1 Introduction 
According to UNICEF, 218 million children are engaged in child labour worldwide. 
Over 58 per cent of the figure comes from the Asian and Pacific regions. Child labour is 
often hard and hazardous to a child’s physical, mental and moral wellbeing and it is 
found to perpetuate poverty (e.g. Wahba 2000). The research on child labour often 
employs household decision-making models. Recent studies have brought evidence, that 
the balance of power between spouses makes it impossible to view the household as a 
single unit (Basu 2004). Moreover the household consumption patterns are found to 
differ depending on who takes the decisions and who earns the income (e.g. Udry 1996; 
Browning et al. 1994). Basu (2004) noted that women show stronger preference for 
children’s wellbeing and are seen as more sensitive to the cost of child labour than men. 
Duflo in Gender Equality in Development (2005) stated that children are healthier in 
families where the woman has bargaining power. Thus this paper examines the effects 
of mother’s intra-family status on child labour1 and school attendance using the Nepal 
Living Standards Survey data (2003-2004). 
Albeit it is widely acknowledged that the main cause of child labour is parental poverty  
and that concentrating on economic development reduces child labour most effectively, 
the mechanisms to alleviate child labour are not straightforward (Basu and Van 1998). 
In reality, child labour persists with a host of interrelated problems such as unskilled 
adult labour force, poor and exploitative work conditions and gender bias. In some 
previous models that take children only as assets with no bargaining power, child labour 
can be decreased by constraining parents’ choices by public policies and regulation 
(Brown et al. 2003). Another set of models supposes that parents are altruistic towards 
their offspring, but adult labour markets have rigidities, which drive child labour (Basu 
and Van 1998). A household chooses child labour, if the returns to education are not 
sufficient to compensate families with the lost income on schooling (Brown et al. 2003). 
Yet, the option for child labour is not always school attendance, but being idle. 
Children’s education is a luxury good in the sense that a poor family begins consuming 
it as soon as the household income rises sufficiently, taking into consideration the 
expected future utility of schooling (Basu and Van 1998). However the expected costs 
and returns to education in the future labour market with respect to child work are 
difficult to measure (Rosati and Deb 2004). School fees in public education add up to 
the cost of education. It very likely contributes to the fact that every third school-aged 
child in Nepal does not attend school or work (ILO-IPEC 1996). This may suggest, that 
many families are wealthy enough not to send children to work, but not quite enough to 
be able to educate them.  
This paper tests the hypothesis of Basu (2004) stating that in a family where the power 
is evenly balanced between the parents, children will be least likely to work. The 
econometric approach for doing this utilizes a bivariate probit model with two 
dependent variables; school attendance and working. A set of previously studied 
indicators is used to characterize the intra-family power relations. Cigno et al. (2001) 
have found evidence that mother’s education level has an effect on children’s school 
attendance. In Vietnam children are less likely to work if parents are educated (Rosati 
and Tzannatos 2006). On the other hand, Rosati and Deb (2004) point out, that poorer 
                                                 
1  Child labour is economic activity performed by a person under the age of fifteen.   2
households with lower schooling may have a greater respect for education than other 
families, which may affect their propensity to send children to school. Labour income, 
which is often used in child labour studies, is a tricky indicator for measuring women’s 
bargaining power, since female labour supply function is negatively sloping for low-
income districts and positively sloping for high income districts (Dasgupta and Goldar 
2005). Moreover the labour supply decisions are possibly subject to intra-household 
bargaining, which may cause endogeneity to these estimates. Therefore the non-labour 
income indicator (remittances) most likely receives more straightforward evidence in 
the analysis. The mother’s characteristics such as a higher marriage age and her ability 
to control fertility are found to improve a woman’s bargaining power (e.g. Jejeebhoy 
1995; Chiappori and Oreffice 2007). This study finds evidence that the effect of 
mother’s status is essential on children’s schooling and working, measured with 
mother’s marriage age, birth controlling awareness and her remittances. Parents’ 
education has a very positive sign for the estimate upon children’s schooling. The 
gender bias can be seen in school participation rates in Nepal; one fourth of school-aged 
girls were out of school in 2004, whereas the corresponding figure for boys was 15 per 
cent (UIS). Albeit the number of economically active children by gender is almost 
equal, girls work almost double the hours relative to boys (NLSS 2). Alas, girls seem to 
be the first ones to stay home when the relative cost of schooling rises. 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in Asia with one of the highest child labour force 
participation rates in Asia. The country ratified the ILO child labour convention in 1997 
with a minimum working age of 14 years. Nevertheless, one in every three children is 
still engaged in child work (Gilligan 2003). Poverty, inequality and the social mentality 
have led to low productivity and discontentment in Nepal, which still remains in an 
unstable state after a decade long civil war. One central constraint in Nepal’s economic 
development has been the inadequate human capital development (UNESCO 2006).  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the variables. 
Section 3 outlines the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.  
2  Data and variables 
This study examines the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2 (NLSS 2) data, conducted by 
the staff of the Central Bureau of Statistics Nepal and World Bank in 2003-2004.2 The 
sample size for the total survey is 3,912 families. The number of families analysed is 
2,155, in which the number of children aged 5 to 14 is 4,473. No family clustering is 
done, thus a few children have the same mother in the sample. This may cause a slight 
bias in the standard deviations and significance levels, but does not affect the estimates. 
The survey covers a wide range of information on a member, household and community 
level. Household level information encompasses e.g. family assets, adequacy of 
consumption and the presence of physical infrastructure. On a member level the data 
covers demographics, activities, income, migration and education etc. This study does 
not utilize the data on children away from home,3 because the information concerning 
their actual use of time, parents, and id-codes, is not complete enough in NLSS 2.  
                                                 
2  The collection period of NLSS 2 was a tense and uncertain period of the civil war in Nepal 
3  These children were working, studying or their activity was unknown.    3
Each child labour study uses a slightly different framework and set of explanatory 
variables. Here the explanatory variables include the essential child, parent, family, 
community and the key intra-family status variables. Moreover, the model (outlined in 
the next section) was tested separately for the key status indicators for both parents to 
avoid multicollinearity, but more importantly to see the differences in the estimates 
upon child labour and school attendance. The status variables include both parents’ 
labour hours, incomes, remittances, ages, education levels, mother’s marriage age and 
her awareness of birth control methods. In particular the two aforementioned are 
expected to have an impact on a woman’s intra-family status (as e.g. in Chiappori and 
Oreffice 2007; Quisumbing and Hallman 2006). Remittances are a form of non-labour 
income, which is found to have an impact on children’s wellbeing depending on the 
receiver in the previous research (e.g. Duflo 2005). These are represented in 1,000 
Nepalese Rupees and were calculated by summing up all remittances coming from 
different donors. Comparing the estimates show how assets depending on the receiver 
affect child labour and schooling. Labour income can be thought to improve the 
bargaining power of the person earning the money and is central in determining 
children’s time use in working and studying. The variables were calculated by adding 
together all separate incomes from different activities and occupations that the parent 
had done during the preceding 12 months. The payment basis for different activities was 
either fixed, hourly based or cash or in-kind and these were summed to make up the 
total value in 1,000s of Rupees. However there may be some endogeneity in mothers’ 
indicators, since the total female labour is possibly subject to a preliminary intra-family 
bargaining. Labour hours in twelve months’ time were calculated by adding up all work 
hours from different activities. A correlation analysis showed that maternal education 
correlates with less child work and more studies.4 Parents’ education variables are 
recoded in a manner that being illiterate is one. If the parent is literate, but has no formal 
education the education code is two. Code three represents one year of completed 
classes and so forth. The completed SLC has the code 13. The class 12 is coded 14 and 
a completed Bachelor’s degree has the code 15. The code for a completed Master’s 
degree is 17 and for a Doctorate it is 20.5 A dichotomous variable measures the 
unemployment of either parent in the model, which could be thought to be a reason for 
sending children to work. However parental unemployment has received different 
evidence from Brazil. Parikh and Sadoulet (2005) found that child labour negatively 
linked to parental unemployment. The inter-spousal age difference, which in some 
marital bargaining models is found important to wife’s bargaining power is tested here 
as the husband-wife difference in years. Parents’ ages in years were also tested 
separately in the model. Mother’s chronic illnesses, a dichotomous variable, is expected 
to have an impact on the workload left for the rest of the family. Household’s 
engagement in self-employment (e.g. family-owned enterprises) has in previous 
research received significant evidence to have an impact on children’s school 
attendance and child labour (e.g. Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997). House sale value as 
a control for wealth is presented in 1,000s of Rupees. The data for the hunger variable 
was collected by asking the household head that: ‘Do you consider that you or any 
member of your family eats too little food to live a healthy and active live?’.6 The 
                                                 
4  All correlations of the explanatory variables in the model were checked and found moderate. 
5  Thus the codes represent the completed years of studies + 2. 
6  26 per cent answered ‘yes’.   4
distance to a water source or to school is represented in minutes. The toilet variable is 
plugged into the model, since having a toilet increases hygiene, which through better 
health affects a child’s ability to participate in education or work. Having piped water in 
the house decreases the time needed in carrying water and it may increase the time 
available for schooling. These amenities are both also proxies for the communal 
infrastructure and wealth. In rural areas women’s status is usually lower in terms such 
as education, income, work burden and mobility. Mother’s intra-family status varies as 
well according to the ethnic group, religion and caste. In Nepal the ethnic diversity is 
considerable7 and a person’s status and social ranking continues to be determined by the 
caste system. In the analysis the ethnic group is classified into 15 largest groups.  
The child’s characteristics, such as age, are essential in the model, since activeness and 
productivity tends to increase with age. As the child gets older the relative cost of 
schooling goes up, since he or she becomes increasingly productive in the work place. 
The ages are represented dichotomously in classes.8 The birth order is classified to 
firstborns, secondborns and fourthborns or more,9 since in NLSS 2 the firstborns tend to 
be the most active. The family size is important in determining whether the child works, 
since big families may have multiple adult wage earners living under the same roof. The 
child’s gender is playing an important role in working and schooling decisions in Nepal, 
since traditionally males receive the bulk of investments. Information on migration is 
included in the model, since moving from one district to another may improve working 
conditions. 
2.1 Descriptive  statistics 
See the Appendix. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the data. The incidence 
of child labour in the sample is 31 per cent. 13 per cent of the children only work. The 
overall gender distribution of working children is balanced (works remotely variable in 
Table 2), but working males often attend school simultaneously, whereas working 
females do not (Table 3). Females have a higher incidence of exclusive work and 
housework than males in both age categories, as 50 per cent of females between 10 to 
14 years carry out housework (Table 8). Children tend to work more when the mother 
works (Table 5). The girls in particular work almost double. On average 10 per cent of 
the children are idle. When the mother receives labour income, fathers seem to be 
working less and family size tends to be smaller by one child. Table 4 presents a graph 
of school enrolment ratios by age. The highest rate, 83 per cent, is for 10-year-olds. It 
decreases by age and already one fourth of 14-year-olds have dropped out of school. 
School participation rate in the total sample is 76 per cent. A child in a small family 
usually attends school more often than a child in a big one. Child labour increases 
significantly with age, since 10-14 year-olds work three times more often than 5-9 year-
olds (Table 6). Rural and poor areas have a clearly higher incidence of child labour than 
urban and richer areas. Children in rural contexts attend school far less often. Only 52 
per cent attend school in rural areas. Nearly 82 per cent of urban children attend school 
and in the capital city the figure is already 93 per cent. A small family size is related 
                                                 
7  There are dozens of different ethnic groups and over 120 spoken languages in Nepal (Gordon 2005). 
8  6 years is the reference category. 
9  Third born is the reference category.   5
with more schooling and clearly less exclusive working. Table 7 shows that on average 
children attend school more often in families that are self employed in Nepal. The 
percentage of children involved in exclusive child labour is over seven times higher for 
children in the poorest consumption quintile. The average number of labour hours in an 
average week among working children is 11 hours. One fourth of child labourers work 
for over 20 hours a week on average. Poverty, measured with the consumption quintile 
and adequacy of food (Table 9), is central in driving children to work. Child labour 
decreases and schooling increases while moving up from one consumption quintile to 
another. In the richest quintile 80 per cent of the children (age of 5 to 14 years) attend 
school. In Nepal the majority of the child labour takes place in the agriculture, mostly as 
unpaid family workers (CDPS 1997). Other major sectors employing children are the 
service, communication and transportation sectors (CDPS 1997).  
3  Bivariate probit model 
The connection between children’s time allocation and relative female power is studied 
with the following econometric model. This paper does not go through the formal intra-
household game theory, which can be reviewed e.g. in Lundberg and Pollak (1994) and 
Hoddinott et al. (1993). A bivariate probit model tries to encompass the factors that 
influence the probability of child’s school attendance and working in a reduced form 
model (the presentation follows Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997). Schooling and 
working decisions are assumed interdependent. They are not assumed to solely follow a 
sequential choice process. Therefore, a bivariate probit model is used to test the 
likelihood of child labour and school attendance, with individual and household 
characteristics. It allows the existence of correlated disturbances between the two probit 
equations and enables analysing whether this joint estimation makes a significant 
difference in regard to two univariate probit models. The model uses two binary 
dependent variables; whether child attends school and or works. In this paper the child 
labour is regarded as remunerative or non-remunerative work, excluding all household 
work. School attendance is defined dichotomously as 1, if the child attends school. It is 
an input of child’s participation to education, but as such, it does not reveal how many 
hours a day a child spends at school. Therefore it may co-exist with child labour. Child 
labour, which is as well a dichotomous variable, gets a value one if the child has worked 
in the past.10 
Briefly, y
*
1 represents the decision of child work11 and y
*
2 the decision of attending 





1 X1+  ε1, y1 =1  if y
*





2 X2+ ε2,    y2 = 1 if y
*
2 > 0, 0 otherwise 
                                                 
10 A univariate tobit model for a dependent variable of child labour hours was tested as well to see 
whether the cumulative sum of child labour hours during the preceding 12 months gives different 
results than the dichotomous variable in the bivariate probit model. It showed that the tobit-model 
results are in line with the bivariate probit.    
11 All economic work of children aged 5-14 (except housework) is taken into account when coding the 
second dependent variable. Thus, a distinction between the forms of child work; child labour (prevents 
school attendance) and child work (allows simultaneous school attendance), is not made.    6
E [ε1] = E [ε2] = 0,   Var [ε1]= Var[ε2] = 1,     Cov [ε1, ε2] = ρ. 
The likelihood function for maximization:  





L = ∏    ∫        ∫     Φ2 (z1, z2 ; ρ) dz2 dz1 
             -∞       -∞ 
where Φ2, the bivariate normal density function is:   
Φ2 (z1, z2 ; ρ) = [2π(1- ρ
2)
½]




2 – 2ρz1 z2)] 
ρ is a coefficient of correlation between the error terms in the two equations. β1 and β2 
are the parameter column vectors (in transpose). X1 and X2 are column vectors of 
exogenous variables which determine respectively, working and schooling propensities. 
The variables in the vectors X1 and X2 are shown in the first column in the Table 10.  
To avoid the correlation issues between parents’ status variables testing was done one at 
a time by removing the equivalent father’s variable (Table 10) and plugging in mother’s 
variable (Table 11). Thus the father’s estimates can be compared with mother’s 
estimates since all else is equal. 
4 Results 
Tables 10-13 present the results from bivariate probit analyses for the total, male and 
female samples.12 Tables 10 and 11 show that the age is a considerable factor in 
defining child’s time use. Albeit school starts normally by the age of 6, 56 per cent of 
the children attend preschool in NLSS 2. Children tend to quit school when they get 
older very likely because they are increasingly needed as wage earners. Accordingly, 
the results in Table 10 show first a rise and then a drop in school attendance by age. 
Working shows an increasing path by age. The birth order and working are linked, since 
the firstborns have a significant positive sign for the estimate upon working, suggesting 
that they are very likely sent to work before their younger siblings.  
A key variable, remittances accrued to mothers show a negative sign upon child labour, 
suggesting that non-labour income that is allocated to the mother has a considerable 
effect on child labour. Father’s remittances on the other hand seem to have an opposite 
effect on child labour (positive sign). Nevertheless, fathers’ remittances have a positive 
sign upon children’s school attendance. The nature of the remittances may differ when 
accruing to the fathers than to the mothers, but this shows that the effect of income on 
child labour is clearly different depending on the recipient. The estimates show that 
parents’ work burden has an increasing effect on child labour and an opposite effect 
upon schooling. The estimate for mother’s labour hours (Table 11) has a positive 
significant sign upon child labour, whereas the corresponding figure for the father is 
negative (but significant only at 15 per cent significance level), suggesting that when the 
mother works children work more likely as well. This may be an implication of a low 
maternal bargaining power. Father’s work burden has a significant negative sign upon 
                                                 
12 The number of iterations that the SAS achieved to run in the bivariate probit model is less than 200 
due to the total number of variables (51). The probit model was tested as well with a smaller number 
of variables. The analysis received parallel results.     7
children’s education, suggesting that father’s labour burden affects children’s school 
attendance negatively. Poverty and the area may be linked with parents who work a lot, 
which may imply that these families cannot afford to send their children to school, but 
instead they have to send children to work. Estimates show that both parents’ schooling 
affects child labour negatively and children’s school attendance positively. Father’s 
estimates are slightly more significant. This possibly suggests that decreasing the inter-
spousal education gap does not increase wife’s bargaining power in deciding over 
children’s time use, since educated fathers possibly appreciate children’s schooling as 
much. Mother’s awareness of birth control issues has a positive estimate for children’s 
schooling. This is in line with the hypothesis; these mothers may have more bargaining 
power and thus children are sent to work less often. The estimates show that mother’s 
marriage age has a negative effect on child labour. This implies that women who have 
tied the knot later may have more bargaining power in the family and thus children are 
sent off to work less often. However many issues are connected to later marriage age 
that improve mother status, such as usually they have a higher level of completed 
studies and a smaller family size. Father’s unemployment affects children’s schooling 
negatively, which very likely implies that families with unemployed household head 
cannot afford sending children to school. Table 12 shows that the father’s 
unemployment affects female child labour negatively, which is in line with the evidence 
from Brazil (Parikh and Sadoulet 2005). The inter-spousal age difference has a positive 
sign for the estimate upon studying and negative sign for working, suggesting that the 
age difference does not increase child labour. Furthermore father’s age has a negative 
estimate upon child labour (Table 11 second column on the left), suggesting that the 
older the father is the less the child works. In Nepal the age difference is not striking, 
but there are clear ethnicity related differences (Casterline et al. 1986).  
The negative signs of the bivariate probit-model estimates suggest that when the family 
is self-employed, children attend school less likely. In these families children are more 
likely needed as a work force.13 The estimates show that when the family owns their 
house (a proxy for wealth) children attend school more probably and work less. Piped 
water (this affects the amount of housework and is a sign of wealth) has a positive sign 
for the schooling estimate, suggesting that families that have piped water are wealthier 
and can afford to send children to school.  Not having a toilet has a negative sign for the 
schooling estimate and a positive sign for working. The estimates show that hunger 
affects both schooling and working negatively. Household size affects working 
negatively according to the estimates, which suggests that big families can afford to 
send more of their offspring to school, due to multiple wage earners (e.g. extended 
households). As expected, child labour is more visible in rural households. The distance 
to school decreases school attendance. The ethnic group affects child labour and 
schooling. Higher castes such as Brahman, Magar, Tharu and Newar educate their 
children more likely, whereas Tamangs and Muslims do not. Child labour is more 
probable among Chhetri, Magar, Kami and Tamang. Muslim children are less active as 
their parents send them to work or school less often than other ethnic groups.  
                                                 
13 In Table 7 it is shown that on average children in self-employed families attend school more often 
than children in non-self employed families. The reason for the difference in the bivariate probit-
model and in the averages produced by cross tabulation is that the model controls all other factors 
such as family wealth (self-employed families are e.g. on average 2.5 times wealthier, which affects 
school attendance positively).   8
Child’s gender clearly affects schooling and working. The estimates in Table 12 show 
that males are more often sent to school, whereas girls are working in or outside the 
household.  Mother’s remittances affect male labour differently than female labour. The 
estimates show that male children work less often than female children if mother 
receives remittances, which is a sign of a male preference. Very likely young mothers 
favour male children, because the male offspring has an important role in the Nepalese 
culture in performing rituals and inheriting family properties etc. (Leone et al. 2003). 
Male child is often mother’s most important asset in bargaining for old age benefits 
(Karki 1988). Father’s remittances have an opposite sign for the estimate, suggesting an 
increase in male child labour. This may be explained by possible differences in the 
nature of the remittances to men and women. Mother’s labour income (Table 13) has a 
positive sign upon male child labour, which most likely is suggesting that mothers and 
sons work because the family is poor.14 In this case also the mother very likely has a 
lower bargaining power which affects her status in the bargaining process of sending 
boys to work or not.15 Mother’s marriage age has an effect of decreasing female child 
labour, which possibly suggests that, older mothers have more bargaining power, have 
already produced sons and can start favouring daughters and may thus send girls to 
work less often. According to the estimates self-employed families send boys to school 
clearly less often than families that are not self-employed. The house sale value seems 
to have a bigger effect on female children’s schooling, possibly suggesting that families 
start educating girls only when the income is sufficient enough. The distance to a water 
source affects female child labour positively, suggesting that when the water source is 
further away girls need to work more often than boys. The distance to a school has a 
negative impact on female children’s school attendance, which again is a sign of male 
preference in the society.  
5 Conclusion 
The previous research has devoted some attention to examining the effect of mother’s 
intra-family status on child labour. This paper uses data from the Nepal Living 
Standards Survey 2 to analyse whether children use their time differently in a situation 
where the mother has a say in the intra-household decision-making process. The relation 
was studied with a bivariate probit model with a set of bargaining power indicators. The 
results show that the non-labour income (remittances) has a reverse impact depending 
on the receiver. Moreover the mother’s remittances have an effect of decreasing child 
labour, whereas the father’s remittances do the opposite, suggesting that the non-labour 
income in the hands of a woman decreases child labour more than in the hands of a 
man. Rising the mother’s marriage age has an effect of decreasing child labour. The 
mother’s birth controlling awareness affects the propensity to send children to school 
positively. The parents’ education affects significantly children’s school attendance and 
working. The impact is almost equal for the father and the mother, suggesting that 
decreasing the inter-spousal education gap does influence children’s time use 
significantly. The distance to a water source has an effect of increasing female child 
labour and the distance to a school affects especially girls’ school attendance negatively. 
                                                 
14 Over 3.26 times poorer measured with average house sale values. 
15 The bargaining power of the working mothers was lower compared with non-working mothers in 
NLSS 2 measured with indicators such as education, marriage age and remittances.   9
Moreover females have higher probabilities to leave school when the relative cost of 
education rises. The fees on education, as well as discrimination in families should be 
eliminated to increase poor children’s, especially females’ welfare in Nepal. This paper 
brought evidence to the hypothesis that improving the balance of power in a household 
decreases child labour and enhances their school attendance, which contributes in 
stopping the transmission of child labour to the next generation.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max.  NOB 
Child-level variables          
Age of the child  9.20  2.81  5  14  4473 
Birth order of the child   2.86  1.82  1  11  4473 
Gender (male = 1)  0.51  0.50  0  1  4473 
Student 0.76  0.43  0  1  4473 
Idle 0.10  0.30  0  1  4473 
Only works  0.13  0.34  0  1  4473 
Chores and remote work  0.40  0.49  0  1  4473 
Works and studies  0.26  0.44  0  1  4473 
Chores 0.18  0.39  0  1  4473 
Remote work  0.31  0.46  0  1  4473 
Total child labour hours last 12 months  278.75  573.20  0  5760  4473 
Average child labour hours last week  7.25  14.04  0  112  4473 
Total chore hours last 12 months  93.65  283.68  0  2880  4473 
Total chore hours last week  2.18  6.44  0  70  4473 
Child has migrated  0.07  0.26  0  1  4473 
Interspousal differences 
Labour income differential   0.31  0.41  0  1  3109 
Education differential  2.72  3.73  -11  15  4433 
Age differential   4.65  4.76  -30  32  4059 
Working hour differential (mother/father)*  0.83  1.97  0.00  99.50  3655 
Mother's characteristics          
Mother can write  0.28  0.45  0  1  4473 
Mother's education   1.64  3.32  0  15  4473 
Mother is unemployed  0.13  0.34  0  1  4473 
Mother has migrated  0.78  0.41  0  1  4473 
Mother's remittances  6080.76  32378.80  0  900000  4473 
Mother's age  34.31  6.37  20  49  4473 
Mother is chronically ill  0.06  0.24  0  1  4473 
Mother's age at marriage  16.82  3.20  5  35  4458 
Mother is aware of birth control  0.77  0.42  0  1  4458 
Mother's burden of chores (hours 12 ms)  1058.98  587.26  0  4320  4473 
Mother's labour income  3542.86  24425.98  0  1438400  4473 
Mother's total work hours 12 months  2713.49  1079.76  0  8102  4473 
Father's characteristics          
Father's total work hours 12 months  2360.41  953.97  0  6510  3695 
Father lives in the household  0.83  0.37  0  1  4472 
Father's education  4.35  4.49  0  18  4433 
Father can write  0.64  0.48  0  1  3690 
Father is unemployed  0.12  0.33  0  1  4473 
Father has migrated  0.34  0.48  0  1  3692 
Father's remittances  1638.78  10538.75  0  250000  4473 
Father's age  39.16  7.93  5  69  4059 
Father's labour income  24930.44  315096.28  0  20800000  4473 
 
continues ... 
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continued ..... 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  Min.  Max.  NOB 
Household level variables          
hhsize 6.76  3.11  2  32  4473 
Self employment  0.28  0.45  0  1  4472 
Family owns the house  0.92  0.27  0  1  4473 
House sale value in 100,000 Rs.  2.75  7.86  0.01  20  4118 
Piped water dummy  0.16  0.37  0  1  4473 
No toilet  0.61  0.49  0  1  4473 
Education is not adequate  0.27  0.44  0  1  4227 
Family has experienced hunger lately  0.26  0.44  0  1  4473 
Rural household  0.77  0.42  0  1  4473 
Water situation is bad  0.24  0.43  0  1  3363 
Ethnicity          
Cchetri 0.15  0.36  0  1  4473 
Brahman (hill)  0.13  0.34  0  1  4473 
Magar 0.06  0.24  0  1  4473 
Tharu 0.07  0.25  0  1  4473 
Tamang 0.07  0.25  0  1  4473 
Newar 0.08  0.27  0  1  4473 
Muslim 0.07  0.25  0  1  4473 
Kami 0.04  0.19  0  1  4473 
Yadav 0.03  0.16  0  1  4473 
Rai 0.03  0.18  0  1  4473 
Gurung 0.02  0.15  0  1  4473 
Damain_Dholi 0.02  0.15  0  1  4473 
Limbu 0.01  0.11  0  1  4473 
Thakuri 0.02  0.13  0  1  4473 
Sarki 0.02  0.13  0  1  4473 
Teli 0.01  0.12  0  1  4473 
Chamar/Harijan/Ram 0.01  0.12  0  1  4473 
Dhanuk 0.02  0.12  0  1  4473 
Mallah 0.01  0.12  0  1  4473 
Other ethnicity group  0.13  0.34  0  1  4473 
Distances in minutes          
School 17.39  26.55  0  1200  4473 
Health post  48.47  67.64  0  1440  4473 
Buss stop  347.68  1115.47  0  12960  4473 
Dirt road  282.25  1046.37  0  12960  4473 
Shops 43.97  297.44  0  8640  4473 
Bazaar 30.88  132.48  0  2880  4473 
Market 208.00  633.49  0  14400  4473 
Water source  4.14  36.95  0  1440  4473 
Post office  58.25  135.18  0  2880  4473 
          
Note: * excludes housework.           
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Table 2: Summary statistics on selected variables by gender 
 
   Males  Females 
Variable  Mean  Std dev  Mean  Std dev 
Child's characteristics         
Child's  age  9.24  2.78 9.15 2.84 
Birth order  2.85  1.85 2.88 1.79 
Student 0.81  0.39 0.71 0.45 
Idle  0.10  0.30 0.11 0.31 
Only  works  0.09  0.28 0.18 0.39 
Works in the hh and remotely  0.34  0.47  0.46  0.50 
Works and studies  0.25  0.43  0.28  0.45 
Does  chores  0.05  0.22 0.32 0.47 
Works  remotely  0.31  0.46 0.32 0.47 
Total child labour hours  189.77  441.06  372.26  672.68 
Remote work days a week  1.68  3.23  3.36  4.97 
Remote hours a day  1.11  2.21  1.93  3.18 
Remote work hours last week  5.07  11.16  9.55  16.23 
Total chore hours last 12 months  19.85  127.90 171.20 368.98 
Chore days a week  0.19  1.06  1.58  2.74 
Chore hours a day  0.09  0.50 0.71 1.34 
Total chore hours a week  0.47  2.99 3.98 8.32 
Migrated 0.07  0.26 0.07 0.26 
Status variables       
Age  differential  4.71  4.67 4.60 4.86 
Mother's income as a fraction of parental income  0.31  0.41  0.30  0.40 
Education differential  2.64  3.71 2.80 3.74 
Mother's characteristics       
Household chores a year  1064.23 578.71  1053.47  596.21 
Can write  0.29  0.46 0.27 0.45 
Education level  1.68  3.37 1.59 3.27 
Unemployed  0.13  0.34 0.12 0.33 
Migrated 0.78  0.41 0.78 0.41 
Remittances 6116.25  32173.90 6043.46  32600.08 
Age 34.40  6.48  34.22  6.25 
Yearly labour income  3731.53 32040.75 3344.58  12039.53 
Father's characteristics       
Lives at home  0.83  0.37  0.83  0.37 
Can write  0.63  0.48 0.65 0.48 
Education level  4.32  4.47 4.39 4.50 
Unemployed  0.13  0.33 0.11 0.32 
Migrated 0.34  0.47 0.35 0.48 
Remittances 1834.29  12074.88 1433.31 8632.94 
Age 39.31  7.95  39.00  7.90 
Yearly labour income  28676.23 437350.98 20994.01 51252.70 
Sample size   2292     2181      14
Table 3: Distribution of children by economic activity status 
   School only  School and work  Work only  Not active  Total 
Age group          
5-9 64.8  8.4  5.4  21.4  100 
10-14 45.2  33.5  16.6  4.7  100 
          
Gender          
Male 59.3  22.7  7.5  10.4  100 
Female 51.1  18.3  14.2  16.4  100 
          
Development region           
East   55.6  19.6  11.3  13.5  100 
Central 50.5  18.2  14.3  17  100 
West 66.4  22.4  3.9  7.2  100 
Mid West  53.6  22.5  11  12.9  100 
Far West  50.9  26.4  10.6  12.2  100 
          
Ecological zone           
Mountains 44.2  32  10.3  13.5  100 
Hills 55.3  25.1  10.1  9.6  100 
Terai 56.8  15.3  11.5  16.5  100 
          
Urban 81.9  8.4  4  5.7  100 
Kath. Valley  92.7  3  2  2.3  100 
Other 77.3  10.6  4.9  7.2  100 
          
Rural 51.7  22.2  11.7  14.4  100 
East Mts./Hills  41.5  30.7  13.7  14.2  100 
West Mts./Hills  56.3  26.5  9  8.1  100 
East Terai  51.8  12.9  15.5  19.8  100 
West Terai  59.2  22.2  5.8  12.8  100 
          
Consumption quintile           
Poorest 38.7  13.4  20.5  27.3  100 
Second 48  23.2  11.4  17.5  100 
Third 57.5  24.5  9.7  8.2  100 
Fourth 62.2  26.6  5.7  5.5  100 
Richest 80  15  2.7  2.3  100 
          
Nepal   55.3  20.6  10.8  13.3  100 
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Table 4: School enrolment ratios in each age group  
 
Table 5: Mother’s labour income status and children’s (aged 5-14) activities  
     
     





No. of obs.     3330  1143 
Family size    7.0  6.1 
Working time of fathers (hours in 12 months)  2384.7 2285.3 
Children aged 5-14       
Goes to school (1 = yes)  male 0.83  0.76 
  female 0.75  0.59 
Is idle (1 = yes)  male 0.08  0.14 
  female 0.10  0.14 
Only works (1 = yes)  male 0.08  0.10 
 female  0.15  0.28 
Does chores and works remotely (1 = yes)  male 0.33  0.35 
 female  0.44  0.53 
Works and studies (1 = yes)  male 0.25  0.24 
 female  0.29  0.25 
Does household chores (1 = yes)  male 0.05  0.06 
 female  0.29  0.42 
Works remotely (1 = yes)  male 0.31  0.31 
 female  0.31  0.35 
All work during last 12 months (hours)  male 185.4  202.9 
 female  325.7  504.7 
Total chores during last 12 months (hours)  male 18.1  24.9 
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Age in years  16
Table 6: Children’s time use by birth order and family size (NLSS 2) 
 
   NOB  Student  Only works  Work and study  HH chores  Idle 
NOB   3411  603  1786  813  459 
Birth order    2.78  2.9 2.87  2.62  3.4 
Family size    6.59  7.18  6.6  6.51  7.5 
By birth order            
First born  1722  0.80  0.13 0.27  0.22  0.07 
Second born   1090  0.78 0.13  0.25  0.18  0.09 
Third born   815  0.74  0.15 0.25  0.19  0.11 
Fourth born  578  0.74  0.13 0.29  0.17  0.12 
Fifth born or more  768  0.71 0.14  0.27  0.13  0.15 
By family size            
4 or less  770  0.86  0.08 0.27  0.16  0.06 
From 5-6  1826  0.78  0.13 0.3 0.2  0.09 
From 7-8  1052  0.69  0.18 0.24  0.19  0.13 
Over 9  825  0.72  0.14 0.21  0.14  0.13 
 
 
Table 7: Self-employment and children’s time use 
   Household self employed (in agriculture or other) 
Children's time use  Yes  No  
Attends school  0.79  0.75 
Is idle   0.09  0.11 
Only works  0.12  0.14 
Works in hh or out  0.35  0.42 
Works and studies  0.23  0.28 
Does household chores  0.16  0.19 
Other work than hh chores  0.27  0.33 
 
Table 8: Time use of children by gender 
  Aged 5-9    Aged 10-14 
 Boys  Girls  Total    Boys  Girls    Total 
No. of obs.  1202  1210  2412     1090  971  2061 
Is a student (1 = yes)  0.78 0.68 0.73  0.85 0.74 0.80 
Is idle (1 = yes)  0.17 0.19 0.18  0.02 0.01 0.01 
Only works (1 = yes)  0.05 0.13 0.09  0.13 0.25 0.19 
Does chores and works remotely (1 = yes)  0.16  0.27  0.21  0.54 0.71 0.62 
Works and studies (1 = yes)  0.11 0.14 0.12  0.40 0.46 0.43 
Does household chores  (1 = yes) 0.03  0.17  0.10  0.07 0.50 0.28 
Works remotely (1 = yes)  0.13 0.16 0.14  0.51 0.52 0.51 
All work during last 12 months (hours) 82.3  185.3  134.0  308.2 605.2 448.2 
Total chores during last 12 months (hours) 15.0  97.4  56.3    25.2 263.1  137.2 
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Table 9: Characteristics of the sample households by their hunger status 
   No hunger  Hunger 
No. of obs.  3301  1172 
Age of the father  39.1  39.3 
Age of the mother  34.3  34.1 
Education of the father (years)  4.9  2.9 
Education of the mother (years)  1.9  0.8 
Household size  6.9  6.4 
Value of the house Rs.  333,698  110,520 
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Table 10: Bivariate probit analysis  
   Studies  Works 
Approx Approx  Variable Estimate  Std 
Error 
t Value 




Pr > |t| 
Child's characteristics             
5 years old  -0.82  0.11  -7.46  ***  -1.07  0.16  -6.62  *** 
7 years old  0.15  0.11  1.30    -0.37  0.12  -3.06  *** 
8 years old  0.28  0.11  2.43  **  0.08  0.11  0.76   
9 years old  0.30  0.12  2.52  **  0.32  0.11  2.80  *** 
10  years  old  0.47 0.12  4.05  ***  0.60 0.11  5.66  *** 
11  years  old  0.34 0.13  2.65  ***  0.70 0.12  6.08  *** 
12  years  old  0.19 0.11  1.72  *  1.16 0.11  10.80 *** 
13 years old  -0.08  0.12  -0.61    1.13  0.12  9.74  *** 
14  years  old  0.06 0.13  0.48    1.47 0.12  12.20 *** 
Firstborn -0.08  0.08  -0.96    0.20  0.08  2.54  ** 
Secondborn  0.02 0.08  0.21    0.06 0.08  0.72   
Fourth born or over  0.06  0.08  0.79    -0.10  0.07  -1.37   
Is male  0.54  0.05  9.88  ***  -0.14  0.05  -2.74  *** 
Child  migrated  0.16 0.18  0.91    0.05 0.14  0.39   
Key variables             
Remittances in 1,000 Rs. to 
mother 
0.00 0.00  0.27    -0.01 0.00  -1.90  * 
Remittances in 1,000 Rs. to father  0.00  0.00  1.77  *  0.00  0.00  1.77  * 
Fathers labour income  0.00  0.00  -0.11    0.00  0.00  0.53   
Fathers labour in 1,000 hrs  -0.09  0.03  -2.77  ***  -0.04  0.03  -1.42   
Father's education attainment  0.06  0.01  7.94  ***  -0.04  0.01  -6.28  *** 
Interspousal age difference  0.01  0.01  2.17  **  -0.01  0.01  -2.65  *** 
Birthcontrol aware mother  0.51  0.06  8.35  ***  -0.03  0.06  -0.47   
Mother's marriage age  0.01  0.01  1.18    -0.03  0.01  -2.92  *** 
Parent's characteristics               
Father  migrated  -0.04 0.07  -0.67    -0.08 0.06  -1.24   
Mother migrated  -0.04  0.07  -0.56    0.04  0.06  0.69   
Mother is unemployed  -0.13  0.09  -1.46    -0.10  0.08  -1.14   
Father is unemployed  -0.14  0.08  -1.89  *  -0.05  0.08  -0.64   
Mother  chronically  ill  0.12 0.12  1.06    0.05 0.10  0.50   
Other characteristics             
HH is self employed  -0.12  0.06  -1.91  *  -0.09  0.06  -1.57   
House sale value in 1,000 Rs.  0.00  0.00  3.54  ***  0.00  0.00  -5.75  *** 
HH has piped water  0.19  0.12  1.65  *  -0.02  0.09  -0.19   
No toilet  -0.61  0.08  -7.81  ***  0.11  0.07  1.64   
Hunger  -0.15 0.06  -2.53  **  -0.13 0.06  -2.09  ** 
Household  size  -0.01 0.01  -1.26    -0.04 0.01  -4.01  *** 
Cchetri  0.05 0.10  0.53    0.23 0.09  2.54  ** 
Brahman (hill)  0.42  0.12  3.49  ***  -0.02  0.10  -0.21   
Magar  0.27 0.14  2.00  **  0.25 0.12  2.04  ** 
Tharu  0.24 0.12  2.07  **  0.05 0.11  0.44   
Tamang -0.29  0.11  -2.69  ***  0.25  0.11  2.20  ** 
Newar  0.26 0.15  1.66  *  0.12 0.13  0.93   
Muslim  -0.26 0.11  -2.35  **  -0.34 0.12  -2.84  *** 
Kami  0.16 0.15  1.09    0.26 0.15  1.77  * 
Yadav -0.13  0.16  -0.80    0.17  0.17  0.98   
Rai  0.17 0.16  1.09    0.21 0.16  1.32     19
continued .... 
   Studies  Works 
Approx Approx  Variable Estimate  Std 
Error 
t Value 




Pr > |t| 
Gurung  0.30 0.23  1.28    0.00 0.21  -0.01   
Damain/Dholi  0.28 0.19  1.49    0.11 0.18  0.61   
Sarki  0.12 0.21  0.56    0.14 0.20  0.67   
Thakuri  0.33 0.28  1.20    0.08 0.20  0.38   
Dhanuk -0.15  0.21  -0.72    0.12  0.20  0.59   
Rural household  -0.14  0.09  -1.55    0.37  0.08  4.50  *** 
Distance to water  0.00  0.00  -0.50    0.00  0.00  0.50   
Distance  to  school  0.00 0.00  -2.73  ***  0.00 0.00  1.23   
Intercept  0.27  0.27  1.01     -0.01  0.25  -0.06    
 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 11: Estimates for variables tested one by one in the above bivariate probit model (table 
10)  
   Studies  Works 
Approx Approx  Key variable tested 
separtely in the bivariate 








Pr > |t| 
0.00 0.00  0.23    0.00 0.00  1.29    Mother's labour income 
instead of father's labour 
income               
-0.05 0.03  -1.45    0.17 0.03 5.73  ***  Mother's labour in 1,000 
hrs instead of father's 
labour                
0.08 0.02  4.99  ***  -0.07 0.01  -5.71  ***  Mother's education 
attainment instead of 
father's  education              
-0.01 0.01  -1.20    0.01 0.01 2.35  **  Mother's age instead of 
age differential               
0.00  0.00 -0.04    -0.01  0.00 -1.90  *  Father's age instead of age 
differential               
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Table 12: Bivariate probit results: male and female samples 
   Males  Females 
   Studies  Works  Studies  Works 
Variable    Coeff t  Value Pr>|t|  Coeff  t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| 
Child's 
characteristics                  
5 years old  -0.89  -5.59  ***  -1.00  -4.34 ***  -0.46  -3.02 *** -1.23 -4.05  *** 
7 years old  0.34  1.97  **  -0.44  -2.50 **  0.18  1.18   0.32  1.79  * 
8 years old  0.25  1.51    0.07  0.45   0.42  2.56  **  0.68  3.90  *** 
9 years old  0.34  1.89  *  0.28  1.68 *  0.31  1.95 *  0.88  5.08  *** 
10 years old  0.49  2.92  ***  0.61  4.12  *** 0.48 2.98  *** 1.11 6.60  *** 
11 years old  0.41  2.20  **  0.73  4.49  *** 0.37 2.13  ** 1.27 6.86  *** 
12 years old  0.29  1.77  *  1.22  8.13  *** 0.21 1.28    1.67 9.60  *** 
13 years old  -0.04  -0.19    1.14  6.95  *** -0.01 -0.05    1.72  9.41  *** 
14 years old  0.13  0.72    1.47  8.53  *** 0.06 0.34    2.08 11.00 *** 
Firstborn -0.08  -0.63    0.28  2.54 **  -0.03  -0.29   0.04  0.36   
Secondborn -0.02  -0.15    0.10  0.89   0.08  0.71   -0.02  -0.19  
Fourth born or over  0.06  0.56    0.00 -0.02    0.15 1.43    -0.20 -1.88  * 
Child migrated  0.11  0.44    0.12  0.64   0.54  2.01  **  -0.22  -1.07  
Key variables                  
Remittances in 
1,000 Rs. to 
mother 
0.04 1.24   -0.05  -1.95  * 0.00  -0.43   -0.01  -1.48  
Remittances in 
1,000 Rs. to father 
0.00 1.13   0.01  2.22  **  0.01 1.32    0.00 -0.03   
Fathers labour 
income 
0.00 -0.38    0.00 0.90    0.00  0.52   0.00  0.63  
Fathers labour in 
1,000 hrs 
-0.04 -0.80    -0.06  -1.48    -0.01  -0.29   -0.05  -1.13  
Father's education 
attainment 
0.06 4.86  ***  -0.03  -2.73 ***  0.07 6.60  ***  -0.06  -5.63  *** 
Interspousal age 
difference 
0.01 0.86   -0.01  -1.02   0.02 2.38  ** -0.02  -1.90  * 
Birthcontrol aware 
mother 
0.61 6.96  ***  -0.06  -0.73   0.45 5.23  *** 0.03 0.33   
Mother's marriage 
age 
0.01 0.67   -0.01  -0.89   0.02 1.30    -0.02  -1.66  * 
Parent's 
characteristics                  
Father migrated  -0.05  -0.54    -0.17  -1.91 *  -0.06  -0.69  0.05  0.55   
Mother migrated  0.08  0.87    -0.17  -1.95 *  -0.04  -0.43  0.18  1.94 * 
Mother is 
unemployed 
-0.13 -1.05    -0.15  -1.28    -0.13 -0.98    0.01  0.07   
Father is 
unemployed 
-0.15 -1.36    0.12 1.10    -0.07 -0.61    -0.24 -2.12  ** 
Mother chronically 
ill 
0.12 0.70   0.03  0.19   0.05  0.29   0.01  0.03  
Other 
characteristics                  
HH is self 
employed 
-0.23 -2.43  ** -0.11  -1.24    -0.05  -0.55   -0.06  -0.63  
House sale value in 
1,000 Rs. 
0.00 1.63   0.00  -5.15 ***  0.00 4.13  *** 0.00 -3.27  *** 
HH has piped 
water 
0.19 1.01   -0.04  -0.29   0.21 1.34    -0.01  -0.09   
No toilet  -0.62  -5.27  ***  -0.02  -0.23   -0.28  -2.67  ***  0.25  2.57  ** 
Hunger -0.24  -2.75  ***  -0.17  -2.02  **  -0.05  -0.59   -0.13  -1.46  
Household size  -0.01  -0.36    -0.04  -2.71 ***  -0.01  -1.15   -0.04  -2.97 *** 
Cchetri -0.21  -1.51    0.20  1.55   0.64  4.79  ***  0.29  2.13  ** 
Brahman (hill)  0.24  1.30    -0.03  -0.22   0.92  5.62  ***  0.06  0.39  
Magar 0.12  0.60    0.34  2.00  **  0.77 4.04  *** 0.35 1.90  *   21
continued .... 
   Males  Females 
   studies  works  studies  works 
Variable    Coeff t  Value Pr>|t|  Coeff  t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| 
Tharu 0.01  0.05    0.02  0.15    0.74 4.44  *** 0.12 0.70   
Tamang -0.48  -3.06  ***  0.30  1.80 *  0.35  2.25 **  0.33  2.00 ** 
Newar 0.33  1.26    0.14  0.78   0.50  2.50 **  0.18  0.96   
Muslim -0.12  -0.73    -0.44  -2.43  **  -0.07  -0.44   -0.23  -1.33  
Kami 0.00  -0.02    0.41  2.04  ** 0.77 3.86  *** 0.12 0.54   
Yadav -0.07  -0.32    0.18  0.74    -0.22 -0.94    0.70  2.73  *** 
Rai 0.03  0.13    0.35  1.54    0.77 3.50  *** 0.12 0.53   
Gurung 0.19  0.54    0.00  0.00    1.06 3.09  *** 0.13 0.41   
Damain/Dholi 0.22  0.81    0.19  0.77   0.97  3.51  ***  0.09  0.32  
Sarki 0.01  0.05    0.03  0.09   0.48  1.47   0.76  2.32 ** 
Thakuri 0.25  0.66    0.16  0.60   1.13  2.46 **  0.07  0.21   
Dhanuk -0.10  -0.37    0.16  0.63   -0.50  -1.47   0.30  0.91   
Rural household  -0.12  -0.86    0.30  2.53 **  -0.07  -0.53   0.47  3.94 *** 
Distance  to  water 0.00  -0.19   0.00  -0.05   0.00  -0.93   0.01  1.76 * 
Distance to school  0.00  -0.82    0.00  1.03   -0.01  -4.52  ***  0.00  0.69  
Intercept 0.64  1.64      -0.12  -0.32     -0.79  -2.10 **  -0.90  -2.42 ** 
 
Table 13: Variables tested in the above model one by one for comparisons 
   Males  Females 
   student  work  student  work 
Variable    Coeff t  Value Pr>|t|  Coeff  t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| Coeff t  Value Pr>|t| 
0.00 0.37    0.00  1.75  *  0.00 -0.84    0.00 0.47    Mother's labour 
income instead 
of father's 
labour  income                 
0.02 0.50    0.13  2.98  *** 0.01 0.17    0.13 2.88  ***  Mother's labour 
in 1000 hours 
instead of 
father's labour 
hours                 
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